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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 09-2140
                           
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MARTIN PURNELL, a/k/a Martin Timothy Spencer, Jr.; 
MARTIN PURNELL, 
                                      Appellant
                           
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
District Court  No. 1-03-cr-00095-01
District Judge: The Honorable Sue L. Robinson
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 14, 2010
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 14, 2010)
                             
OPINION
                             
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
In March of 2005, a jury convicted Martin Purnell of four counts of distributing
more than 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). 
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware sentenced Purnell to, inter
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We1
exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
2
alia, a below guidelines sentence of 138 months of imprisonment on each count, with the
terms of each count to run concurrently.  On appeal, we affirmed Purnell’s conviction,
vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing pursuant to Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).  United States v. Purnell, 317 Fed. Appx. 118 (3d Cir. 2008).
On remand, Purnell’s pre-sentence report was revised using the 2008 Guidelines
Manual, which incorporated the two level decrease in § 2D1.1 for crack cocaine offenses
required by Amendment 706 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  See United States v. Wise,
515 F.3d 207, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (observing that the general effect of Amendment 706 to
the United States Sentencing Guidelines was a two level decrease in the offense level).  In
addition, because Purnell met with law enforcement authorities following remand, he
qualified for the safety valve provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a),
which further decreased his offense level by two points and rendered the mandatory
minimum of ten years inapplicable.  As a consequence, his total offense level decreased
from 34 to 30.  Because his criminal history category remained a level I, his guideline
range decreased from 151 to 188 months, to 97 to 121 months.  At the conclusion of the
resentencing proceeding, the District Court sentenced Purnell to, inter alia, 102 months of
imprisonment on each of the four counts, with the terms to run concurrently.  This timely
appeal followed.1
Purnell argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the District
3Court failed to fully consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the
disparity between crack cocaine sentences and powder cocaine sentences.   According to
Purnell, the District Court failed to consider his argument that the revised guideline range,
even as modified by Amendment 706, still reflected a significant disparity between crack
and powder cocaine sentences.  He further argues that the District Court treated the
guideline range as though it was mandatory.
We review a claim that a district court committed procedural error in sentencing
under an abuse of discretion standard.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d
Cir. 2009) (en banc).  “[T]he party challenging the sentence has the burden of
demonstrating unreasonableness.”  Id.   
We conclude that Purnell has failed to meet his burden.  The District Court
properly calculated the guideline range, noting that it had been revised to reflect the lower
offense level applicable to the distribution of crack cocaine pursuant to Amendment 706
and the benefit of qualifying under the safety valve provision.  The Court pointed out that
there were no objections to the presentence report.  Accordingly, consistent with the
Supreme Court’s instruction in Gall v. United States, the District Court afforded “both
parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem[ed] appropriate[.]”  552
U.S. 38, 49 (2007).  The Court also heard the impassioned testimony of Purnell’s pastor,
his aunt, and his mother, all of them urging a lenient sentence.  
At the conclusion of this testimony, the District Court observed that all but one of
the § 3553(a) factors had been accounted for in the guideline analysis, and that the “one
4factor not included in the calculation [wa]s this defendant’s personal history and
characteristics.”  Purnell argues that this statement shows that the District Court
considered only his personal history and characteristics, instead of all of the § 3553(a)
factors, and that it treated the guideline range as though it was mandatory.  We disagree in
light of the Court’s subsequent remarks.  It noted that on remand Purnell’s revised
guideline range included the lower offense level applicable to crack cocaine, that Purnell
no longer faced the mandatory minimum of ten years, that his personal life was marred by
an “unstable home life,” and that he had resorted to distributing drugs and “poisoning his
community.”  The District Court then exercised its discretion and weighed these
circumstances to determine if on resentencing a variance from the “revised advisory
guideline range” of 97 to 121 months was warranted, and concluded that a within
guidelines sentence was needed to “provide just punishment and adequate deterrence.” 
This analysis not only demonstrated that the District Court was well aware of the advisory
nature of the guidelines, it also complied with the Gall Court’s mandate that the District
Court “make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”  Id. at 50.
We conclude that the District Court’s sentence was procedurally sound.  For that
reason, we will affirm the District Court’s sentence of 102 months of imprisonment.  
